Capital Control in Theory and Practice

Authors

  • TAN Xiaofen School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China
  • TONG Linfeng School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 102206, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.20069/4hxbpq38

Keywords:

capital control, international capital flows, capital account openness, international economic policy coordination

Abstract

The global financial crisis of 2008 triggered intense fluctuations in cross-border capital flows, prompting a reevaluation of how to effectively manage such movements for structured global capital flows. This paper addresses the challenges arising from the increased volatility in cross-border capital flows, particularly as China integrates further into the global economy. Existing academic literature lacks comprehensive studies analyzing capital control policies from both theoretical and practical perspectives, while also considering the evolving dynamics of cross-border capital flows and contemporary reflections from scholars.

To fill this gap, our paper systematically reviews the theoretical foundations of implementing capital control policies, the International Monetary Fund’s stance on managing cross-border capital flows, practices of emerging economies in capital account management, various models of capital account openness, and the associated risks, challenges, and policy responses linked to China’s pursuit of capital account liberalization. While recognizing potential drawbacks, such as setbacks to national welfare and the transmission of adverse signals, the literature also acknowledges the instrumental role of capital control policies in maintaining the stability of domestic economic and financial systems and safeguarding the autonomy of domestic monetary policies. Moreover, it emphasizes that capital control policies effectively address the pecuniary externalities and aggregate demand externalities arising from private sector decisions.

Practically, many emerging market economies employ policy tools like capital taxes and unremunerated reserve requirements. During the initial stages of significant public health crises in 2020, some emerging market economies deployed strategies such as local currency-to-US dollar swap contract auctions and reductions in foreign exchange reserve ratios to enhance the liquidity of domestic currencies. Additionally, with the emergence of new characteristics in cross-border capital flows in recent years, the IMF believes that the future efforts in managing cross-border capital flows will primarily focus on three aspects:
① Assessing the necessity of implementing preemptive macroprudential policies;
② Evaluating and categorizing capital controls targeting illegal financial activities;
③ Identifying abnormal capital flows and devising responsive measures.

Despite China’s relatively stringent capital controls, a discernible trend towards relaxation is evident. However, compared to developed countries, China’s current capital flow managements remain incomplete, and various activities evading capital controls persist. As China moves towards widening capital account accessibility, a comprehensive fusion of various capital flow management measures is advocated to mitigate the macroeconomic impacts of capital flow volatilities.

Our paper goes beyond the traditional focus on the “ex-post” effects of capital control policies, emphasizing their “ex-ante” theoretical imperative. It also contributes by extensively reviewing capital account management measures in other emerging market economies and delineating distinctive capital account openness models observed in Japan and Hungary. Consequently, it provides insightful guidance for China’s pursuit of a broader, more inclusive, and deeply ingrained framework for financial openness, facilitating a more tailored and efficient implementation of capital controls to shield against external shocks.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

[1] Forbes, K. J., & Warnock, F. (2012). Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight and retrenchment. Journal of International Economics, 88(2), 235-251.

[2] International Monetary Fund. (2012). The liberalization and management of capital flows: An institutional view. IMF Policy Paper.

[3] International Monetary Fund. (2020). Global financial stability report: Markets in the time of COVID-19. IMF Policy Paper.

[4] 谢亚轩. (2020). 中国资本市场上的国际资本流动. 中国外汇, (10), 10.

[5] Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C. M., & Végh, C. A. (2004). When it rains, it pours: Procyclical capital flows and macroeconomic policies. NBER Working Paper, No.10780.

[6] 靳玉英, 罗子嫄, 聂光宇. (2020). 国际基金投资视角下中国资本流动管理: 有效性和外溢性. 经济研究, (7), 21-40.

[7] Korinek, A. (2010). Excessive dollar borrowing in emerging markets: Balance sheet effects and macroeconomic externalities. SSRN Working Paper. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=967524

[8] Greenwald, B. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986). Externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2), 229-264.

[9] Bianchi, J. (2011). Overborrowing and systemic externalities in the business cycle. American Economic Review, 101(7), 3400-3426.

[10] Benigno, G., Chen, H., Otrok, C., et al. (2013). Financial crises and macro-prudential policies. Journal of International Economics, 89(2), 453-470.

[11] Nie, O. (2022). The information content of capital controls. Journal of International Money and Finance, 127, 102681.

[12] Erten, B., Korinek, A., & Ocampo, J. A. (2021). Capital controls: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Literature, 59(1), 45-89.

[13] Bianchi, J., & Lorenzoni, G. (2021). The prudential use of capital controls and foreign currency reserves. NBER Working Paper, No.29476.

[14] Basu, S., Boze, G., Gopinath, G., et al. (2020). A conceptual model for the integrated policy framework. IMF Working Paper, No.121.

[15] Farhi, E., & Werning, I. (2016). A theory of macroprudential policies in the presence of nominal rigidities. Econometrica, 84(5), 1645-1704.

[16] Schmitt-Grohé, S., & Uribe, M. (2016). Downward nominal wage rigidity, currency pegs, and involuntary unemployment. Journal of Political Economy, 124(5), 1466-1514.

[17] Korinek, A., & Simsek, A. (2016). Liquidity trap and excessive leverage. American Economic Review, 106(3), 699-738.

[18] 范从来, 赵永清. (2009). 中国货币政策的自主性: 1996—2008. 金融研究, (5), 22-34.

[19] Farhi, E., & Werning, I. (2014). Dilemma not trilemma? Capital controls and exchange rates with volatile capital flows. IMF Economic Review, 62, 569-605.

[20] Passari, E., & Rey, H. (2015). Financial flows and the international monetary system. The Economic Journal, 125(584), 675-698.

[21] Rey, H. (2016). International channels of transmission of monetary policy and the Mundellian trilemma. NBER Working Paper, No.21852.

[22] Edwards, S. (2015). Monetary policy independence under flexible exchange rates: An illusion? The World Economy, 38(5), 773-787.

[23] 魏英辉, 陈欣, 江日初. (2018). 全球金融周期变化对新兴市场国家货币政策独立性的影响研究. 世界经济研究, (2), 52-62.

[24] Han, X. H., & Wei, S. J. (2018). International transmission of monetary shocks: Between a trilemma and a dilemma. Journal of International Economics, 110, 205-219.

[25] Davis, J. S., & Presno, I. (2017). Capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in a small open economy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 85, 114-130.

[26] International Monetary Fund. (2022). Review of the institutional view on the liberalization and management of capital flows. IMF Policy Paper, No.97.

[27] 朱斌, 王兴华. (2021). 新兴市场国家跨境资本流动风险防范实践: 国际教训及中国经验. 银行家, (4), 37-41.

[28] Cantú, C., Cavallino, P., De Fiore, F., et al. (2021). A global database on central banks’ monetary responses to COVID-19. BIS Working Paper.

[29] De Gregorio, J., Edwards, S., & Valdés, R. (2000). Controls on capital inflows: Do they work? Journal of Development Economics, 63(1), 59-83.

[30] Edwards, S. (1999). How effective are capital controls? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(4), 65-84.

[31] Clements, B., & Kamil, H. (2009). Are capital controls effective in the 21st century? The recent experience of Colombia. IMF Working Paper, No.09/30.

[32] Sigurgeirsdóttir, R., & Wade, H. (2015). From control by capital to control of capital: Iceland’s boom and bust, and the IMF’s unorthodox rescue package. Review of International Political Economy, 22(1), 103-133.

[33] Babac, K., & Kokenyne, A. (2011). Effectiveness of capital controls in selected emerging markets in the 2000s. IMF Working Paper, No.281.

[34] Chamon, M., & Garcia, M. (2016). Capital controls in Brazil: Effective? Journal of International Money and Finance, 61, 163-187.

[35] Rincón, H., & Toro, J. (2011). Are capital controls and central bank intervention effective? Central Bank of Colombia Working Paper, No.625.

[36] Alfaro, L., Chari, A., & Kanczuk, F. (2017). The real effects of capital controls: Firm-level evidence from a policy experiment. Journal of International Economics, 108, 191-210.

[37] Forbes, K. J., Fratzscher, M., & Kostka, T., et al. (2016). Bubble thy neighbour: Portfolio effects and externalities from capital controls. Journal of International Economics, 99, 85-104.

[38] Keller, L. (2019). Capital controls and risk misallocation: Evidence from a natural experiment. Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper.

[39] 陈旭. (2016). 中东欧国家资本账户开放的经验与启示. 海南金融, (6), 26-31.

[40] Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2006). What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1), 163-192.

[41] 陈峰. (2012). 日本资本账户自由化进程及对中国的启示. 日本研究, (2), 7-13.

[42] 余永定. (2014). 寻求资本项目开放问题的共识. 国际金融研究, (7), 3-6.

[43] 梁红, 余向荣, 刘鎏. (2015). 资本账户开放: 中国是否已经准备好了? 金融市场研究, (7), 11-22.

[44] Fernández, A., Klein, M., Rebucci, A., et al. (2016). Capital control measures: A new dataset. IMF Economic Review, 64(3), 548-574.

[45] Chen, J., & Qian, X. (2016). Measuring on-going changes in China’s capital controls: A de jure and a hybrid index dataset. China Economic Review, 38, 167-182.

[46] 金荦. (2004). 中国资本管制强度研究. 金融研究, (12), 9-23.

[47] 金荦, 李子奈. (2005). 中国资本管制有效性分析. 世界经济, (8), 24-33.

[48] 苟琴, 王戴黎, 鄢萍, 等. (2012). 中国短期资本流动管制是否有效. 世界经济, (2), 26-44.

[49] 刘红忠, 杨小海, 韩永超. (2015). 再论中国资本管制有效性. 世界经济文汇, (6), 20-32.

[50] 李晓峰, 陈雨蒙. (2018). 基于变系数模型的我国资本流动审慎管理研究. 金融研究, (4), 20-34.

[51] 刘永余, 王博. (2016). 中国资本管制的有效性问题: 基于跨境资本套利和套汇活动的研究. 当代经济科学, (2), 10-19.

[52] Kitanos, S., & Zhou, Y. (2022). Effects of China’s capital controls on individual asset categories. Finance Research Letters, 49, 103032.

[53] 张明, 孔大鹏, 潘松, 李江. (2021). 中国金融开放的维度、次序与风险防范. 新金融, (4), 4-10.

[54] 谭小芬, 梁雅慧. (2019). 中国金融开放新阶段的潜在风险及其防范. 新视野, (1), 63-69.

[55] 王曦, 李佳阳, 陈中飞. (2021). 资本账户开放促进经济增长的组合门槛条件分析: 兼论中国局部开放策略. 统计研究, (3), 89-106.

[56] 邓敏, 蓝发钦. (2013). 金融开放条件的成熟度评估: 基于综合效益的门槛模型分析. 经济研究, (12), 120-133.

[57] 胡亚楠. (2020). 资本账户开放的门槛效应及路径研究. 世界经济研究, (1), 68-81.

[58] 陈中飞, 王曦. (2019). 资本账户子项目开放的经济增长效应及中国应用. 管理世界, (1), 97-114.

[59] 国家外汇管理局外汇研究中心课题组. (2021). 我国金融市场开放的七大经验. 中国外汇, (13), 88-90.

[60] 叶亚飞, 石建勋. (2021). 中国资本项目开放: 进程、影响与实现路径: 率先实现实体部门资本项目可兑换的可行性研究. 经济学家, (8), 71-80.

[61] Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65-94.

[62] Ocampo, J. A. (2015). Capital account liberalization and management. WIDER Working Paper Series. World Institute for Development Economic Research.

[63] 杨权, 裴晓婧. (2011). 资本账户开放、金融风险与最优外汇储备. 国际金融研究, (7), 22-33.

[64] 熊衍飞, 陆军, 陈郑. (2015). 资本账户开放与宏观经济波动. 经济学(季刊), (4), 1255-1276.

[65] Laurenceson, J., & Tang, K. K. (2005). China’s capital account convertibility and financial stability. East Asia Economic Research Group Discussion Paper.

[66] 朱孟楠, 闫帅, 寇聪姗, 等. (2017). 资本项目开放会引发货币危机吗? 经济与管理研究, (7), 65-73.

[67] 戴淑庚, 余博. (2020). 资本账户开放会加剧我国的系统性金融风险: 基于 TVP-FAVAR 和 SV-TVP-VAR 模型的实证研究. 世界经济研究. [J].国际贸易问题,2020(1):159-174.

[68] 李力, 王博, 刘潇潇, 等. (2016). 短期资本、货币政策和金融稳定. 金融研究, (9), 18-32.

[69] 吴丽华, 傅广敏. (2014). 人民币汇率、短期资本与股价互动. 经济研究, (11), 72-86.

[70] 方显仓, 孙琦. (2014). 资本账户开放与我国银行体系风险. 世界经济研究, (3), 9-14.

[71] 方意, 颜茹云, 郑子文. (2017). 资本账户开放对银行风险的影响机制研究. 国际金融研究, (11), 33-43.

[72] 杨小海, 刘红忠, 王弟海. (2017). 中国应加速推进资本账户开放吗: 基于 DSGE 的政策模拟研究. 经济研究, (8), 49-64.

[73] 彭红枫, 朱怡哲. (2019). 资本账户开放、金融稳定与经济增长. 国际金融研究, (2), 3-12.

[74] 罗融, 陆文力. (2021). 资本账户开放与国际金融冲击的传导: 基于 DSGE 模型的分析. 经济理论与经济管理, (8), 43-59.

[75] 肖卫国, 尹智超, 陈宇. (2016). 资本账户开放、资本流动与金融稳定: 基于宏观审慎的视角. 世界经济研究, (1), 28-38.

[76] 张泽华, 周闯. (2019). 资本账户开放下的宏观审慎政策和货币政策组合研究. 世界经济研究, (4), 3-16.

[77] 葛奇. (2017). 宏观审慎管理政策和资本管制措施在新兴市场国家跨境资本流出入管理中的应用及其效果: 兼析中国在资本账户自由化过程中面临的资本流动管理政策选择. 国际金融研究, (3), 3-14.

[78] 吴圣金, 刘相阁, 叶国安. (2021). 跨境资本流动宏观审慎管理与资本管制的比较研究. 南方金融, (1), 68-79.

[79] 李婧, 刘瑶. (2019). 托宾税与跨境资本流动管理: 国别实践及对中国的启示. 首都经济贸易大学学报, (4), 23-33.

[80] 孙天琦. (2019). 我国跨境资本流动管理的政策框架和实践. 清华金融评论, (7), 65-70.

[81] Chang, C., Liu, Z., & Spiegel, M. M. (2015). Capital controls and optimal Chinese monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 74, 1-15.

[82] 刘建丰, 潘英丽. (2019). 常态化资本管制的必要性: 基于不同经济发展阶段视角的 DSGE 模型分析. 财经研究, (1), 135-152.

Downloads

Published

2024-01-14

How to Cite

Capital Control in Theory and Practice. (2024). Modern Economic Science, 46(1), 30-44. https://doi.org/10.20069/4hxbpq38